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REVOLUTION	FROM	BELOW	
The	Rise	of	Local	Politics	and	the	Fall	of	Bolivia’s	Party	System1	
Jean-Paul	Faguet2	December	2016	
Abstract	For	50	years	Bolivia’s	political	party	system	was	a	surprisingly	robust	component	of	an	otherwise	fragile	democracy.	How	did	a	gas	pipeline	dispute	spark	a	revolution	that	overturned	the	political	system,	destroyed	existing	political	parties,	and	re-cast	the	relationship	between	state	and	society?		I	examine	how	the	arrival	of	local	government	shifted	the	nation’s	politics	from	a	typical	20th	century,	left-right	axis	of	competition	deeply	unsuited	to	a	society	like	Bolivia,	to	an	ethnic	and	cultural	axis	more	closely	aligned	with	its	major	social	cleavage.	This	shift	made	elite	parties	redundant,	and	transformed	the	country’s	politics	by	facilitating	the	rise	of	structurally	distinct	political	organizations,	and	a	new	indigenous	political	class.	Decentralization	was	the	trigger	–	not	the	cause	–	that	made	Bolivia’s	latent	cleavage	political,	sparking	revolution	from	below.		I	suggest	a	folk	theorem	of	identitarian	cleavage,	and	outline	a	mechanism	linking	deep	social	cleavage	to	sudden	political	change.	
Keywords:	 Cleavage	theory,	political	parties,	elite	politics,	decentralization,	Latin	America,	Bolivia	
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1. IntroductionDuring	the	second	half	of	the	twentieth	century,	Bolivia’s	political	party	system	was	a	surprisingly	robust	component	of	an	otherwise	fragile	democracy.		Although	the	country	suffered	some	190	coups3	in	its	first	190	years	of	independence	(Klein	1992,	Dunkerley	1984),	from	1953	onwards	its	politics	was	characterized	by	a	system	of	political	parties	arrayed	along	a	left-right	axis	typical	of	the	twentieth	century,	which	was	remarkably	stable	(Centellas	2009,	Sabatini	2003).		Such	was	the	dominance	of	this	system	that	the	same	parties	–	indeed	the	same	individuals	–	survived	coups,	economic	shocks,	periodic	civil	disturbances,	guerrilla	insurgency,	hyperinflation	and	economic	meltdown,	and	striking	social	change,	returning	again	and	again	to	take	up	the	reins	of	power.		Why,	then,	did	this	system	suddenly,	unexpectedly	collapse	around	2003?	Bolivia’s	1952-53	revolution	overturned	an	oligarchic	political	system,	extended	full	citizenship	rights	and	education	to	the	indigenous	majority,	broke	up	the	haciendas	and	distributed	land	to	the	highland	peasantry,	and	nationalized	its	mines.		Between	the	1951	and	1956	elections,	the	number	of	registered	voters	increased	from	205,000	to	1.13	million	(Nohlen	1995).		Following	this	vast	social	and	economic	upheaval,	national	politics	coalesced	around	the	Movimiento	Nacionalista	Revolucionario	(National	Revolutionary	Movement,	MNR)	–	a	multiclass	coalition	party	that	straddled	the	center		– with	smaller	parties	to	its	right	and	left	(Bonifaz	2016,	Dukerley	1984,	Klein	1992,Levitsky	2001).		After	the	restoration	of	democracy	in	1982,	the	system	congealed	further	around	Acción	Democrática	Nacionalista	(National	Democratic	Action,	ADN)	on	
3	At	various	points	in	its	history,	during	periods	of	chronic	instability,	Bolivia	suffered	multiple	palace	coups	in	a	single	day.		Many	of	these	“governments”	were	so	ephemeral	that	counting	them	is	difficult.		Experts	disagree	on	the	total	number.	
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the	right,	the	MNR	in	the	center,	and	the	Movimiento	de	la	Izquierda	Revolucionaria	(Movement	of	the	Revolutionary	Left,	MIR)	–	and	its	later	offshoot	the	Movimiento	
Bolivia	Libre	(Free	Bolivia	Movement,	MBL)	–	on	the	left.		Together	these	three	forces	reliably	captured	between	60-75	percent	of	the	vote	in	national	elections	during	the	1980s	and	1990s.	The	degree	of	dominance	in	Bolivian	politics	is	hard	to	overstate.		The	leader	of	the	1952	revolution,	and	of	the	MNR,	was	Victor	Paz	Estenssoro.		The	1956	election	brought	to	power	his	close	ally	Hernán	Siles	Zuazo,	also	of	the	MNR,	who	in	1960	handed	the	presidency	back	to	Paz	Estenssoro.		Paz	Estenssoro	was	re-elected	in	1964,	but	then	quickly	overthrown	by	his	vice-president,	an	air	force	general.		Omitting	military	regimes,	the	electoral	sequence	is	as	follows:	
Table	1:	Elected	Presidents	of	Bolivia	
	
Data	source:	Nohlen	2005	Even	this	list	understates	the	lock	a	small	number	of	parties	and	people	had	on	power.		For	example,	Paz	Zamora	served	as	Siles’	vice-president	before	becoming	president;	
Year Party* President
1952 MNR Victor	Paz	Estenssoro
1956 MNR Hernán	Siles	Zuazo
1960 MNR Victor	Paz	Estenssoro
1964 MNR Victor	Paz	Estenssoro
1982 MNRI-MIR	§ Hernán	Siles	Zuazo
1985 MNR Victor	Paz	Estenssoro
1989 MIR Jaime	Paz	Zamora
1993 MNR Gonzalo	Sánchez	de	Lozada
1997 ADN-MIR Hugo	Banzer
2002 MNR Gonzalo	Sánchez	de	Lozada
*	Governing	party,	or	lead	party(s)	of	a	governing	coalition.
§	The	MNRI	was	a	leftist	offshoot	of	the	main	MNR.
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likewise	Sánchez	de	Lozada	had	been	Paz	Estenssoro’s	minister	of	planning;	and	Banzer	–	dictator	during	the	1970s	–	headed	the	coalition	that	sustained	Paz	Zamora	in	power.	Given	such	antecedents,	the	scale	and	speed	of	the	system’s	collapse	were	extraordinary.		In	the	2005	general	election,	the	ADN,	MIR	and	MBL	were	unable	to	field	candidates,	and	the	MNR	attracted	only	six	percent	of	the	vote;	by	2009	it	too	had	disappeared	from	the	ballot.		In	2010	the	MNR	polled	zero	votes	in	323	of	337	local	elections,	and	ADN	did	worse.		The	MIR	and	MBL	have	ceased	to	exist.	Why	did	the	system	collapse	so	suddenly?		The	proximate	cause	was	civil	disturbances	linked	to	a	planned	gas	pipeline	to	the	historic	enemy,	Chile,	which	led	to	the	resignation	and	flight	of	President	Sánchez	de	Lozada	in	2003.		Without	doubt	this	political	crisis	was	severe,	and	included	a	massacre	of	protestors	by	state	security	forces.		But	it	beggars	belief	that,	in	a	country	where	social	mobilization	is	high	and	protest	common,	a	dispute	over	a	gas	pipeline	killed	off	Bolivia’s	political	parties,	party	system,	and	indeed	the	dominant	dimension	of	political	contestation.		All	of	these	had	survived	so	much	worse.		Broader	economic	policy	is	also	not	a	credible	culprit.		Although	the	fiscal	balance	did	spike	downwards	in	2002,	this	reflected	a	sharp	fall	in	revenues,	not	expenditures,	as	we	shall	see	below.		Poor	economic	performance,	another	common	claim,	is	even	less	credible.		The	economy	had	not	been	in	recession	since	1986.		A	system	that	withstood	hyperinflation	twenty	years	earlier	was	not	toppled	by	2.7	percent	growth.4	This	paper	analyzes	the	collapse	of	Bolivia’s	party	system,	and	the	reformulation	of	its	politics,	through	the	joint	lenses	of	cleavage	theory	and	Schattschneider’s	(1960)																																																									4	Yearly	GDP	growth	data	available	at:	http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=BO		
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related	concept	of	dimensional	replacement.		The	result	is	a	theoretical	mechanism	connecting	enduring	social	cleavages	to	competitive	party	systems	that	can	explain	sudden,	decisive	political	change.		I	exploit	the	wonderful	Bolivian	Electoral	Atlas	(Tribunal	Supremo	Electoral	2010)	database	that	corrects	recording	errors	in	previously	published	election	results,	providing	greater	accuracy	and	detail	than	hitherto	possible.	I	argue	that	in	Bolivia’s	incompletely	institutionalized	democracy	(Mainwaring	and	Scully	1995),	the	national	political	party	system	was	not	organized	around	the	major	cleavage	that	characterizes	society.		It	was	organized,	rather,	around	a	subordinate	cleavage	relevant	for	a	minority	of	the	population,	which	was	imposed	from	above	by	political	elites	who	rode	the	1952-53	revolution	to	power.		In	the	context	of	a	low-income	country	with	partial	democratic	incorporation,	this	cleavage	became	“frozen”,	sustained	by	electoral	laws	that	supported	elite	dominance	of	Bolivia’s	politics.	Sweeping	decentralization	reforms	in	1994	had	the	unintended	effect	of	revealing	the	underlying	conflicts	that	actually	cleave	Bolivian	society.		Complementary	reforms	to	election	laws	broke	the	oligopoly	that	upheld	the	artificial	cleavage.		Repeated	subnational	elections	revealed	both	this	misalignment	and	a	new	generation	of	leaders	who	emerged	from	the	grass-roots	of	society.		Traditional	parties,	moreover,	failed	to	decentralize	themselves	internally	to	accommodate	new	political	actors	and	surging	citizen	participation	(Faguet	2012).		And	so	Bolivia’s	parties	and	party	system	collapsed	under	the	weight	of	their	own	irrelevance	and	inflexibility.	The	insights	yielded	by	this	approach	are	likely	applicable	beyond	the	Bolivian	case,	to	Venezuela,	Italy,	Ecuador,	Colombia,	and	Peru,	which	also	saw	their	politics	
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collapse	(Morgan	2011,	Roberts	2015).		The	rest	of	this	paper	examines	the	components	of	my	argument	one	by	one.	
2. Theory: Stability and Collapse in Party Systems Let	us	first	follow	Sartori	(1976)	and	Mainwaring	and	Scully	(1995)	and	define	parties	as	political	organizations	that	present	candidates	at	elections	and	are	thereby	capable	of	placing	individuals	into	public	office.		Party	systems	are	the	patterns	of	interactions	resulting	from	inter-party	competition;	they	are	more	than	the	sum	of	their	parties.		They	can	be	characterized	as	stable	equilibria	in	which	parties	compete	for	votes	by	occupying	discrete	positions	in	multi-dimensional	policy/value	space,	as	well	as	providing	jobs,	benefits,	and	other	non-representational	goods	to	partisans.	The	decentralization	literature	is	enormous,	numbering	in	the	hundreds	of	papers	in	political	science,	public	policy,	economics,	and	development	studies	journals,	and	thousands	of	“gray	literature”	studies	and	agency	reports.		But	it	has	little	to	say	about	the	stability	or	instability	of	political	party	systems,	focusing	instead	on	decentralization’s	effects	on	such	issues	as	public	investment,	service	provision,	education	and	health	indicators,	macroeconomic	stability,	or	hierarchical	characteristics	of	party	systems	per	se	(Brancati	2006	&	2008;	Eaton,	Kaiser	and	Smoke	2011;	Faguet	2014;	Faguet	and	Pöschl	2015;	Chhibber	and	Kollman	1998	&	2004;	Treisman	2007).	We	look	to	the	comparative	politics	literature	for	insight.		Here,	a	rich	body	of	work	analyzes	the	origins	and	characteristics	of	political	party	systems.		But	very	little	work	investigates	party	system	collapse.		Four	that	do	are	recent	contributions	by	Cyr	(2012	and	2015),	Lupu	(2014)	and	Morgan	(2011).			
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Cyr	(2015)	examines	when	social	conflicts	lead	to	party-system	change,	arguing	that	ruling	party	elites	deploy	strategies	of	inclusion	and	exclusion	to	try	to	neutralize	social	conflicts	and	preserve	the	status	quo.		The	decisions	they	take	shape	the	impact	of	societal	demands	in	ways	that	–	intentionally	or	not	–	transform	the	party	system.		Cyr	(2012)	examines	when	parties	were	able	to	survive	and	rebound	from	national	party-system	collapses	in	Bolivia,	Peru	and	Venezuela.		She	finds	that	national-level	comeback	requires	command	over	organizational	and	social	resources.		Absent	one,	a	party	may	be	able	to	survive,	but	absent	both	it	is	likely	to	collapse	alongside	the	party	system.	Lupu	focuses	on	the	breakdown	of	individual	political	parties,	as	distinct	from	party	systems.		Between	1978	and	2007,	he	points	out,	one-quarter	of	Latin	America’s	parties	suddenly	became	uncompetitive	in	national	elections.		Why?		Lupu	explains	this	via	a	combination	of	“brand	dilution”:	the	muddying	of	party	identity	through	policy	switches	or	opportunistic	coalitions,	and	poor	performance	in	office.		Parties	with	clear,	distinct	“brands”	can	withstand	a	period	of	poor	performance;	and	parties	judged	to	have	wielded	power	well	can	withstand	brand	dilution.		But	parties	that	muddy	their	identities	and	govern	badly	see	support	collapse.	This	logic	is	very	likely	applicable	to	the	MIR	and	MNR,	and	possibly	the	ADN	too.		But	what	happened	in	Bolivia	goes	beyond	the	collapse	of	individual	parties.		The	process	Lupu	describes	is	a	competitive	dynamic	in	which	voters	switch	preferences	amongst	established	alternatives	arrayed	along	a	dominant	axis.		System	collapse,	by	contrast,	is	when	all	the	parties	collapse	and	take	the	dominant	axis	with	them.		In	competitive	terms,	it	is	a	singularity	that	destroys	the	possibility	of	a	new	equilibrium	in	the	pre-existing	policy	space.		Post-collapse,	voters	will	be	faced	with	a	new	axis	of	
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competition	in	which	preferences	are	aggregates	and	policies	designed	in	different	ways.		This	is	a	fundamentally	different	phenomenon	requiring	different	theoretical	tools.	Morgan	(2011)	provides	such	tools,	comparing	political	system	collapses	in	Bolivia,	Colombia,	Italy	and	Venezuela.		Her	theory	is	based	on	three	distinct	types	of	“linkage”	that	parties	use	to	intermediate	between	society	and	the	state:	(i)	Programmatic	linkages,	based	on	universal	benefits	with	low	conditionality;	(ii)	Clientelism,	based	restricting	benefits	to	well-specified	groups;	and	(iii)	Interest	incorporation	–	an	intermediate	category	–	where	benefits	are	restricted	to	a	group	or	interest,	but	benefit	distribution	within	the	group	is	not	controlled	by	the	party.		This	last	category	is	the	least	obvious;	examples	include	guaranteed	seats	on	party	boards,	spaces	on	party	lists,	and	special	channels	of	access.		Parties	may	blend	different	types	of	appeals	in	their	attempts	to	woo	distinct	groups	of	voters.	Each	kind	of	linkage	can	fail,	but	for	different	reasons.		Programmatic	linkages	fail	when	the	programmatic	differences	between	parties	become	blurred.		Crises	tend	to	provoke	blurring,	especially	when	interparty	agreements	and	international	organizations	constrain	policy	choice	to	options	that	violate	a	party’s	ideology.		Clientelistic	linkages	fail	when	social	change	increases	demand	for	clientelistic	benefits,	but	economic	crisis	restricts	available	resources;	decentralization	and	other	reforms	that	limit	resource	control	can	exacerbate	resource	demand	and	supply.		And	interest	incorporation	degrades	when	social	transformation	demands	adjustment	by	party	systems	to	emerging	interests,	but	the	organizational	constraints	of	routinized	parties	make	this	difficult.		Morgan’s	theory	of	party	system	collapse	is	simply	the	sum	of	all	of	these	factors,	or	at	least	those	that	match	a	particular	system’s	major	characteristics.	
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Morgan’s	theory	is	carefully	argued	and	matches	her	Venezuelan	evidence	well.		But	it	is	ultimately	built	around	benefits	and	their	conditionality.		While	important,	benefits	are	only	part	of	the	story,	and	for	Bolivia	the	less	important	part.		Another	is	the	policy	dimensions,	or	issue	areas,	along	which	benefits	and	services	–	of	any	given	value	–	are	provided.		It	is	not	the	same,	for	example,	for	a	village	government	to	spend	$1000	on	vaccines,	machetes,	or	entertainment	at	the	village	fair,	even	if	the	cost	is	held	constant	and	the	same	voters	benefit.		As	parties	choose	amongst	competing	options,	they	also	make	implicit	choices	amongst	competing	values	in	a	way	that	implies	a	particular	development	path	for	society.		Rival	parties,	in	competitive	responses,	will	choose	different	expenditures	based	on	different	values.		But	they	will	do	so	along	a	given	axis	that	represents	coherent	combinations	in	multi-dimensional	policy	space.		This	is	a	system’s	major	axis	of	political	competition,	which	should	match	society’s	underlying	characteristics.		The	targeting	of	such	benefits	is	a	separate	question,	but	not	a	more	important	one.	
Cleavage	Theory	To	understand	when	and	why	party	systems	collapse,	we	must	first	understand	where	they	came	from.		We	must	understand	the	underlying	conflicts	of	ideas	and	values	that	characterize	society,	and	how	these	map	–	well	or	badly	–	onto	a	party	system.		Hence	we	turn	to	cleavage	theory.		In	their	seminal	contribution,	Lipset	and	Rokkan	(1967)	posit	an	alternative	to	the	fluid,	continuous	adjustments	assumed	by	the	Downsian	(1957)	market-like	mechanism	for	understanding	how	parties	position	and	re-position	themselves	in	response	to	changing	voter	sentiment.		In	their	conception,	parties	and	party	systems	emerge	in	response	to	underlying	socio-political	cleavages	
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in	society.		There	is	ideological	and	organizational	“stickiness”	in	the	process,	and	political	cleavages	can	become	“frozen”	even	as	underlying	social	characteristics	change.		Hence	adjustment,	when	it	happens,	is	potentially	more	dramatic	than	in	a	Downsian	world.	What	are	these	cleavages?		In	Western	Europe,	two	over-arching	historical	processes	produced	four	key	cleavages.		The	national	revolution	produced	cleavages	between:	(i)	centralizing	nation-builders	vs.	distinct	communities	(ethnically/religiously/linguistically)	in	the	periphery,	and	(ii)	between	the	central	state	vs.	the	supranational	Roman	Church.		And	the	industrial	revolution	produced:	(iii)	an	urban/industrial	vs.	rural/landholder	cleavage,	and	later	(iv)	one	between	workers	vs.	owners.		A	society	will	contain	additional	cleavages	of	varying	depth	and	importance.		But	in	Western	European	countries	these	are	the	key	conflicts	that	define	political	competition.		Lipset	and	Rokkan	further	show	that	the	center-periphery,	state-Church,	and	land-industry	cleavages	have	marked	national	party	systems	deeply,	and	the	owner-worker	cleavage	is	the	least	important	of	the	four.	The	tension	between	competing	logics	of	functionality	vs.	territoriality	is	central	to	cleavage	theory	(Hooghe	and	Marks	2016).		Functional	conflict	concerns	the	distribution	of	resources,	opportunity,	and	status	amongst	functional	groups.		Citizens	vote	with	others	in	a	similar	position	wherever	they	may	live,	at	the	risk	of	inviting	conflict	within	the	community.		By	contrast,	territorial	conflict	is	based	on	commitment	to	a	community,	in	which	citizens	vote	with	their	neighbors	without	regard	to	economic	position.		Recent	research	by	Chandler	and	Tsai	(2001)	and	Sides	and	Citrin	(2007)	finds	that	the	role	of	community	and	identity	are	stronger	
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than	Lipset	and	Rokkan	originally	thought.		This	may	itself	be	socially	stratified:	Card,	Dustmann	and	Preston	(2012)	find	that	cultural	concerns	are	of	greatest	importance	amongst	the	lower-educated.	Two	variables	that	Lipset	and	Rokkan	consider	important	for	the	translation	of	cleavages	into	party	systems	are	incorporation	and	representation.		Incorporation	refers	to	the	extent	to	which	the	supporters	of	a	particular	movement	or	party	are	accorded	status	as	political	participants	and	have	full	citizenship	rights.		Representation	refers	to	whether	new	groups	must	join	established	parties	to	ensure	access	to	representation,	or	can	gain	representation	on	their	own.		We	will	see	below	the	importance	of	these	considerations	for	the	case	of	Bolivia.	European	political	parties	that	eventually	formed	around	these	key	cleavages	were	expressions	of	self-conscious	solidary	groups	that	express	the	enduring	identities	of	their	members,	as	distinct	from	their	transient	opinions	or	occupations.		These	collective	identities	gave	rise	to	grass-roots	movements	and	hierarchical	organizations	that	prosecuted	conflicts	between	peripheral	communities	and	the	nation-state,	between	secularists	and	the	Church,	and	eventually	between	workers	and	capitalists.		Conflicts	were	enduring	and	often	acrimonious	because	the	social	cleavages	in	which	they	were	anchored	were	deep,	and	also	because	the	groups	doing	combat	were	strong,	bound	by	solidarity	born	of	lived	experience	(Hooghe	and	Marks	2016).	Because	the	cleavages	that	divide	voters	are	systematic,	their	preferences	are	durably	connected	in	multidimensional	policy	space.		Hence	“issue	coherence”.		Parties	thus	make	programmatic	commitments	across	different	issues	that	are	self-reinforcing.		
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This	implies	punctuated	processes	of	party	system	change	in	response	to	external	shocks,	causing	sudden	jumps	between	equilibria,	or	a	lurch	away	from	equilibrium	altogether.	A	second	source	of	stickiness	is	parties’	internal	organization.		According	to	Lipset	and	Rokkan,	a	party’s	strategic	flexibility	on	important	issues	is	constrained	to	the	extent	it	has	a	loyal	constituency,	activist	volunteers,	self-replicating	leadership,	clear	programmatic	identity,	and	possibly	a	decentralized	internal	structure.		These	attributes	limit	a	party’s	ability	to	change	position	on	issues	of	underlying	conflict.		Parties	thus	spend	most	of	their	lives	seeking	local,	and	not	global,	maxima	(Laver	and	Sargenti	2009,	Hooghe	and	Marks	2016).		Such	discontinuities	explain	one	of	cleavage	theory’s	fundamental	claims	–	that	party	system	change	comes	in	the	form	of	rising	(new)	parties,	and	not	established	party	adaptation.	
Dimensional	Replacement	Lipset	and	Rokkan	build	on	Schattschneider’s	(1960)	theory	linking	political	organization	to	conflict,	especially	his	notion	of	dimensional	replacement	in	party	competition.		“At	the	root	of	all	politics,”	says	Schattschneider,	“is	the	universal	language	of	conflict.”5		By	conflict	he	does	not	mean	violence,	but	rather	contestation	concerning	ideas,	priorities	and	resources.		Such	conflict	is	highly	contagious	in	democracies.		Indeed,	by	prioritizing	participation	and	inviting	intervention	in	conflict,	multiparty	democracies	are	in	many	ways	designed	to	maximize	its	contagion.		By	contrast,	one-party	states	suppress	conflict.		In	democracy,	the	outcome	of	any	conflict	is	determined	
																																																								5	p.2.	
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by	the	extent	to	which	the	“audience”	becomes	involved.		Hence	in	politics,	the	most	important	strategy	concerns	the	scope	of	conflict.	Viewed	through	this	lens,	the	role	of	a	social	movement	is	to	promote	conflict	by	articulating	demands	(grievances,	proposals)	in	a	way	that	resonates	with	the	most	people,	thus	socializing	private	conflict	and	inviting	a	dominant	faction	to	participate	on	its	side.		The	role	of	parties	is	to	craft	policy	proposals	that	cohere	in	three	ways:	(i)	substantively,	e.g.	by	respecting	the	budget	constraint;	(ii)	electorally,	by	garnering	the	broadest	support	amongst	voters;	and	(iii)	financially,	by	maximizing	political	contributions	subject	to	(i)	and	(ii).		This	means	that	parties	want	some	conflicts	to	become	social	and	others	to	remain	private.		If	movements	aim	to	socialize	all	the	conflicts	they	touch,	parties	pick	and	choose.		Government’s	role	is	to	manage	conflicts.	Political	outcomes	depend	on	how	people	are	divided	into	competing	groups,	and	by	extension	on	which	of	the	many	conflicts	become	dominant.		Hence	the	definition	of	alternatives	is	the	supreme	instrument	of	power.		And	the	most	devastating	political	strategy	is	the	substitution	of	conflicts	(Schattschneider	1960).	Figure	1,	for	example,	shows	politics	aligned	along	a	classic	left/workers	vs.	right/owners	cleavage.		In	such	a	system,	parties	invest	heavily	not	just	to	convince	floating	voters	that	one	or	the	other	side	of	the	dominant	divide	is	superior,	but	also	that	they	are	the	most	competent	exponents	of	that	position.		Politicians	invest	throughout	their	careers	to	demonstrate	their	prowess	winning	votes,	and	their	implementational	ability	once	in	office.		Emerging	rivals	who	compete	with	established	actors	on	these	terms	are	ultimately	incrementalists,	even	when	they	succeed.		The	way	to	vanquish	established	parties	–	the	transformative	play	–	is	to	substitute	the	dominant	set	of	conflicts	with	a	new	set	in	a	
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different	dimension.		We	might	read	our	illustration	as	the	substitution	of	left-right	with	a	green/environmental	vs.	brown/dirty-growth	axis,	for	example;	or	one	based	on	religion,	or	ethno-linguistic	identity.		Dimensional	replacement	destroys	the	reputations,	political	capital,	and	ideological	assets	of	established	parties	not	by	sullying	them,	but	by	making	them	irrelevant	in	a	new	politics	that	divides	voters	along	a	different	plane.6	
Figure	1:	Schattschneider’s	Dimensional	Replacement	Theory	
	 	
3. Bolivia’s Political Party System: 1952-2010 The	Nationalist	Revolution	of	1952-53,	which	overturned	the	ancien	régime	and	brought	sweeping	changes	to	Bolivia’s	economy	and	society,	was	led	by	the	MNR	and	its	maximum	leaders,	Victor	Paz	Estenssoro	and	Hernán	Siles	Suazo.		During	the	decade	that	followed,	the	MNR	won	general	elections	overwhelmingly	with	between	76	and	987	percent	of	the	popular	vote.		This	period	is	best	viewed	as	a	new	political	system	in	consolidation	following	a	major	upheaval,	where	a	still-embryonic	opposition	abets	MNR	domination.		A	decade	of	democracy	was	ended	by	a	military	coup	in	1964.		The	two	stable	dictatorships	that	followed	lasted	until	1978,	bookended	by	periods	of	multiple	coups	and	considerable	political	turmoil.		The	political	system	that	returned	to	the	fore																																																									6	I	have	arbitrarily	drawn	both	figures	as	50-50	electoral	splits.		But	a	new	dimension	of	competition	could	aggregate	voters	as	60-40,	70-30,	etc.	7	Paz	Estenssoro	ran	unopposed	in	the	1964	presidential	election,	winning	with	97.9	percent	of	the	vote.	
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following	re-democratization	was	a	consolidated	version	of	the	post-revolutionary	one.		Hence	we	begin	our	analysis	with	the	1979	election,	which	heralded	Bolivia’s	return	to	democracy	in	1982,	and	which	featured	the	full	panoply	of	left-right	forces	that	dominated	politics	until	2003.	To	analyse	party	system	collapse,	we	need	to	understand	the	evolution	of	the	main	parties	that	defined	the	system,	and	compare	their	performance	to	both	marginal	parties	and	rising	challengers.		This	task	is	complicated	by	the	“splinterism”	to	which	politics	in	Bolivia	–	like	many	countries	–	is	prone.		This	is	particularly	so	on	the	left,	where	personal	disagreements	and	battles	for	leadership	compound	ideological	and	programmatic	differences,	leading	small	parties	–	often	no	more	than	personal	vehicles	–	to	splinter	off	from	the	main	party,	test	their	electoral	strength	for	one	or	two	cycles,	and	then	(mostly)	return	to	the	fold	or	disappear	(Mayorga	2005,	Romero	2012).	I	begin	by	aggregating	the	vote	shares	of	the	MIR,	MBL,	MNR	and	ADN	as	Bolivia’s	“Establishment	parties”,	which	defined	its	major	left-right	axis	of	political	competition.		Through	2003,	one	of	these	parties	always	anchored	Bolivia’s	governments,	and	another	always	anchored	its	opposition.8		To	these	I	add	splinters,	which	I	categorize	not	as	political	forces	with	distinct	ideologies,	programmes,	and	electorates,	but	rather	ephemeral	pieces	of	the	establishment.		The	task	quickly	becomes	hairy.		For	example,	the	1980	election	featured	four	variants	of	the	MNR,	three	of	them	joined	in	two	broader	alliances,	and	one9	competing	alone.		It	can	also	be	less	than	obvious:	both	the	Movement																																																									8	The	rising	MAS	quietly	provided	crucial	congressional	support	for	certain	legislative	bills	during	the	MNR’s	short-lived	government	of	2002-03,	leaving	the	ADN	to	lead	congressional	opposition	(Crabtree	2005).	9	Entertainingly,	this	last	was	called	the	“United	MNR”	(MNRU),	and	polled	1.6	percent	of	the	vote.	
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of	the	National	Left	(MIN)	and	the	9th	of	April	Revolutionary	Vanguard	(VR-9),	for	example,	are	excisions	of	the	MNR.		I	categorize	using	the	name	and	origin	of	each	group,	and	then	track	the	political	trajectory	of	leading	figures	in	each.		Where	new	parties	are	led	by	politicians	who	rose	to	national	prominence	through	the	ranks	of	an	established	party,	and	their	votes	mainly	subtract	from	the	established	mother	party,	I	class	these	as	part	of	the	establishment.	The	programmatic	alignment	of	establishment	parties	along	a	left-right,	labor-capital	axis	is	well-documented	by	students	of	Bolivian	history	and	politics	(see	e.g.	Mainwaring	and	Scully	1995,	Malloy	1970,	Roberts	2015,	Seligson	and	Moreno	2006).		Hence	I	limit	myself	here	to	some	of	the	more	important	facts	about	each.		The	MNR	was	formed	in	the	early	1940s	by	moderate-left,	middle-class	intellectuals	who	had	served	in	military	governments	of	the	1930s,	and	admired	the	fascist	examples	of	Germany	and	Italy.		But	its	formative	experience	was	the	1952-53	National	Revolution,	which	began	with	an	urban	workers’	uprising,	which	the	MNR	managed	to	harness	and	lead,	resulting	in	a	sort	of	marriage	of	the	young	party	to	the	workers’	movement.		This	birth	left	indelible	marks,	and	the	MNR	continued	thereafter	to	straddle	the	political	center,	with	some	factions	sticking	to	top-down,	dirigiste	economic	nationalism	and	corporatism,	and	other	factions	adopting	the	discourse	of	class	struggle	and	advocating	extensive	interventions	on	behalf	of	workers	(Anria	and	Cyr	2016).	In	1971,	radical	segments	of	the	MNR	youth	wing	joined	left	militants	from	the	Christian	Democratic	Party	to	form	the	MIR.		Initially	committed,	as	its	name	implies,	to	class	struggle	and	revolution,	over	time	it	became	more	of	a	center-left,	social	democratic	party.		The	MBL	broke	away	from	the	MIR	in	1985	due	to	ideological	and	
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personal	differences	between	their	two	leaders,	Jaime	Paz	Zamora	and	Antonio	Araníbar,	and	positioned	itself	further	to	the	left.10		Finally,	the	ADN	was	founded	in	1979	by	ex-dictator	Gen.	Hugo	Banzer,	absorbing	parts	of	the	Bolivian	Socialist	Falange	(FSB)	and	the	Revolutionary	Left	Party	(PIR).		With	a	pro-business,	small-government,	law-and-order	message,	the	ADN	attracted	support	from	new	economic	elites,	such	as	large-scale	farmers	in	the	eastern	lowlands,	private	mining	entrepreneurs,	and	educated	technocrats	who	emerged	after	the	Revolution	(Klein	1992,	Mesa	et	al.	1997).	“Others”	are	a	collection	of	minor,	non-splinter	parties	mostly	of	the	left,	originating	usually	in	the	workers’	movement	or	radical	intelligenstia,	and	led	typically	by	labor	leaders	or	left-wing	intellectuals.		Examples	include	the	Trotskyite	Vanguardia	
Obrera	(Workers’	Vanguard,	VO),	and	the	Partido	Socialista-1	(PS-1)	of	Marcelo	Quiroga	Santa	Cruz,	a	journalist,	writer	and	academic.		“Other”	also	includes	the	remains	of	the	right-wing	FSB,	which	never	polled	above	1.5	percent	of	the	vote	during	this	period.		A	last,	ideologically	influential	component	in	this	category	is	left-wing	indigenous	parties	promoting	the	rights	and	culture	of	Bolivia’s	indigenous	majority.		Examples	include	the	
Movimiento	Indio	Túpac	Katari	(Túpac	Katari	Indian	Movement,	MITKA)	and	the	
Movimiento	Revolucionario	Túpac	Katari	de	Liberación	(Túpac	Katari	Revolutionary	Liberation	Movement,	MRTKL).		Although	small,	these	parties	were	important	crucibles	of	an	emerging	indigenista	ideology.	
																																																								10	I	discuss	the	MBL	as	a	distinct	party	on	account	of	its	level	of	support	and	endurance	that	greatly	exceed	any	splinter.		But	treating	it	as	a	splinter	would	not	alter	my	analysis.	
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In	addition	to	Establishment	and	Other,	a	distinct	category	of	Neopopulist	parties	gained	importance	during	the	late-1980s.		These	were	built	around	the	charismatic	personalities	of	successful	entrepreneurs	–	in	the	case	of	Conciencia	de	Patria	(Conscience	of	the	Fatherland,	Condepa)	a	television	and	radio	personality,	and	in	the	case	of	Unión	Civica	Solidaridad	(Solidarity	Civic	Union,	UCS)	Bolivia’s	biggest	beer	magnate.		Both	parties	combined	populist	appeals	to	poor,	peri-urban	migrants	often	employed	in	precarious	informal-sector	jobs	with	a	racially-tinged	discourse	that	echoed	their	complaints	and	disorientation	upon	moving	to	the	city.		Both	parties	were	organizationally	weak.		Neither	survived	the	death	of	its	founder,	and	neither	has	fielded	a	presidential	candidate	since	2002.	The	final	category	is,	of	course,	the	MAS,	which	rises	to	prominence	in	2002.		In	sharp	opposition	to	all	of	the	parties	discussed	thus	far,	the	MAS	is	a	bottom-up	political	party,	formed	initially	in	the	rural	Chapare	region	by	militant	coca	growers	and	displaced	miners.		The	MAS’	origins	–	described	with	analytical	insight	by	Anria	(2013),	Anria	and	Cyr	(2016),	and	Van	Cott	(2009),	and	a	huge	wealth	of	empirical	detail	by	Zuazo	(2009)	–	lie	in	rural,	highly	local	social	movements	of	self-government	and	agricultural	producer	groups.		Bolivia’s	1994	Law	of	Popular	Participation,	a	radical	decentralization	reform,	created	over	three	hundred	spaces	of	local	politics	that	had	not	previously	existed	in	a	highly	centralized	country	where	politics	was	by	construction	national	(Faguet	2012,	Faguet	and	Pöschl	2015).		Such	groups	took	advantage	of	these	spaces	to	compete	for,	win	and	exercise	local	power.		And	the	existence	of	local	governments	provided	incentives	for	new	groups	to	emerge.	
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But	the	electoral	laws	of	the	time	prohibited	social	movements	from	competing	directly	in	elections.		So	how	did	the	MAS	grow	rapidly	and	achieve	stunning	electoral	success?		By	agglomerating	hundreds	of	independent	local	organizations	under	its	political	umbrella.		Inspired	by	the	ideology	of	the	indigenista	movement,	the	MAS	adopted	a	“leading	by	following”	approach	in	which	incorporation	was	grass-roots	upward,	privileging	indigenous	people	as	actors	and	agents	in	their	own	right.		More	than	a	slogan,	these	principles	were	followed	in	practice,	and	made	the	MAS	a	highly	distinctive	organization	in	the	Bolivian	context.		Its	internal	characteristics	were	organized	around	self-representation	and	the	attainment	of	power	(local	and	national)	by	the	Bolivian	majority	(Van	Cott	2009).		This	is	very	different	from	the	top-down	organization	and	clientelistic	appeals	of	parties	like	the	UCS	and	Condepa,	or	even	the	MNR	(Zuazo	2009),	whose	modus	operandi	was	to	capture	indigenous	votes	in	order	to	propel	elite	politicians	into	power.	As	the	MAS	moved	from	its	rural	base	into	urban	areas,	the	electoral	imperative	led	it	away	from	organic	movement-party	linkages	to	more	top-down,	co-opting	practices	typical	of	populist	parties.		It	conquered	Bolivia’s	cities	by	co-opting	urban	leaders,	and	hence	the	civic	organizations,	labor	groups,	and	producer	guilds	they	led;	examples	include	the	Federation	of	Neighborhood	Councils	(FEJUVE)	and	the	Regional	Labor	Federation	(COR).		This	dynamic	left	the	MAS	as	a	“hybrid	organization”	with	distinct	logics	of	operation	in	rural	vs.	urban	settings.		It	straddles	the	line	between	party	and	movement,	with	a	multiclass	appeal	to	rural	farmers,	urban	formal	and	informal	workers,	and	middle	class	elements	(Anria	2013).		But	its	grass-roots	origins	live	on.		
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Through	all	of	these	changes,	Anria	argues,	the	rural	base	has	been	able	to	hold	the	MAS	leadership	–	including	Evo	Morales	–	to	account.	
Equilibrium	and	Collapse	How	did	the	system	defined	by	these	parties	evolve	during	the	period	following	Bolivia’s	return	to	democracy?		Figure	2	shows	general	election	voting	trends	between	1979-2009,	with	parties	categorized	as	Establishment,	Neopopulist,	Others,	and	MAS	(including	splinters);	blank	and	null	votes	round	out	the	picture.		Appendix	1	provides	party-by-party	detail,	where	we	see	as	many	as	18	parties	competing	in	1985.	By	1979,	the	initial	dominance	of	the	MNR	had	morphed	into	a	systemic	dominance	of	establishment	parties.		These	parties	reliably	captured	73-76	percent	of	the	popular	vote	in	the	four	elections	between	1979-1989.		The	rest	of	the	vote	was	split	between	other	smaller,	mostly	further-left	parties,	capturing	6-15	percent	of	the	vote,	with	some	12	percent	of	ballots	blank	or	null.	This	system	declined	after	1989,	capturing	only	57-60	percent	of	the	vote	during	the	mid-1990s,	and	then	falling	further	to	40	percent	in	2002-2005.		The	proximate	cause	of	the	decline	is	clear	in	the	graph:	1989	sees	the	emergence	of	neopopulist	parties,	which	rose	to	capture	one-third	of	the	popular	vote	in	1997.		This	correlates	nicely	with	the	decline	of	the	establishment.		But	neopopulists	collapse	to	seven	percent	in	2002,	and	zero	thereafter,	while	the	establishment	continues	to	decline.		Why?		The	answer	is	not	a	blanket	rejection	of	all	political	options,	as	blank	+	null	votes	fall	from	around	12	percent	during	the	1980s	to	six	percent	during	the	1990s	and	early	2000s.		The	graph	shows	great	churning	in	“other”	parties,	as	right-wing	voters	search	for	an	alternative	to	the	now-defunct	ADN.		But	the	secular	trend	during	this	period	is	the	rise	
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and	rise	of	the	MAS,	from	zero	in	1997	to	63	percent	in	the	2009	election,	a	dominance	of	historic	proportions	in	Bolivia	–	broadly	comparable	to	that	of	the	MNR	immediately	following	the	revolution.		Viewing	the	graph	in	its	entirety,	the	rise	of	the	MAS	nicely	explains	the	collapse	of	the	political	establishment	–	to	five	percent	of	the	vote	in	2009.	
Figure	2:	General	Election	Voting	Patterns	
	
Data	source:	Organo	Electoral	Plurinacional-Tribunal	Supremo	Electoral	So	goes	the	most	commonly	told	story	about	Bolivia,	in	which	traditional	parties	decline	and	Evo	Morales	and	the	MAS	surge	to	dominance.		The	story	is	descriptively	true,	as	the	graph	shows.		But	it	obscures	the	deeper,	more	important	fact	that	Establishment	+	Other	parties	collectively	defined	a	primary	left-right	axis	for	Bolivian	politics,	ranging	from	worker-based	parties	advocating	class	struggle	for	revolution,	such	as	the	Revolutionary	Worker’s	Party	(POR	in	Spanish)	and	the	Workers’	Vanguard	(VO),	at	one	end;	through	the	more	moderate	MBL	and	MIR;	on	to	the	MNR	straddling	the	center;	on	to	the	pro-business,	small-state	ADN;	and	from	there	to	the	fascist-inspired,	pro-Church	FSB	on	the	far	right.		This	primary	axis	completely	dominated	Bolivian	politics	during	the	first	decade	following	re-democratization.	
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
1979 1980 1985 1989 1993 1997 2002 2005 2009
General	Elections,	 1979-2009
Establishment	parties Neopopulist	parties MAS	+	splinters Others Blank	&	Null
21
	 21	
While	neopopulists	did	challenge	the	establishment,	they	did	so	in	the	limited	sense	of	taking	their	votes	at	election	time.	Both	the	UCS	and	Condepa	were	programmatically	weak,	highly	personalized	parties	that	relied	on	charismatic	leaders	and	extensive	clientelistic	appeals	for	their	success	(Mainwaring	and	Scully	1995,	Bonifaz	2016,	Van	Cott	2005).		They	did	not	threaten	the	underlying	axis	of	left-right	political	and	ideological	competition.	They	frightened	elites	by	capturing	their	votes,	not	by	espousing	any	cogent	ideas	for	change	(Romero	2003).	The	only	anti-system	votes,	by	which	I	mean	parties	and	candidates	advocating	for	an	issue	space	orthogonal	to	the	dominant	left-right	axis	of	competition,	were	those	of	small	indigenist	parties	like	the	MITKA	and	MRTKL.		Beginning	in	the	1960s	and	typically	spearheaded	by	indigenous	intellectuals11,	these	parties	and	ideologies,	transcended	the	worker-capital	debate,	viewing	Bolivia	instead	through	an	explicitly	ethnic	lens	(Choque	2014).		They	rejected	both	the	dominant	elite	and	their	class-based	analysis.		Their	programmatic	appeals	were	a	blend	of	radical	Indianismo	with	the	more	moderate,	socialist-inspired	Katarismo	(Van	Cott	2005).	
Indianismo	stresses	the	ethnic	character	of	the	oppression	of	the	indigenous	majority,	and	calls	for	the	expulsion	of	European	descendants,	restitution	of	the	land	to	ethnic	leaders,	and	the	reconstitution	of	traditional	altiplano	communities.		Rejecting	capitalism	and	the	“capitalist	model	of	society”,	they	propose	a	return	to	the	collective	ownership	of	property	and	pre-Columbian	forms	of	authority	and	community	self-government.		Katarismo,	by	contrast,	blends	ethnic	rights	claims	with	class	consciousness.		It	seeks	to	reform	Bolivia’s	democratic	institutions	to	incorporate																																																									11	For	example,	Victor	Hugo	Cardenas	(MRTK	and	MRTKL)	and	Fernando	Untoja	Choque	(MKN	and	KND),	university	professors	of	linguistics	and	economics,	respectively.	
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indigenous	forms	of	representation	and	decision-making,	in	order	to	forge	a	society	more	tolerant	of	its	own	diversity	(Choque	2014,	Madrid	2012,	Van	Cott	2005).		Of	the	two,	Kataristas	achieved	greater	political	success	by	allying	with	non-indigenous,	leftist	parties	and	social	movements,	and	so	gaining	many	non-indigenous	adherents.	During	the	20th	century,	the	indigenista	movement	consisted	of	a	number	of	small,	constantly	bickering	and	splitting	parties	that	collectively	never	reaped	more	than	three	percent	of	the	national	vote.		They	operated	as	a	sort	of	steam	valve,	or	perhaps	–	with	the	benefit	of	hindsight	–	a	warning.		But	in	practical	terms	they	represented	no	more	than	a	colorful	appendage	to	a	system	that	reliably	captured	no	less	than	84	percent	of	the	overall	vote,	and	97	percent	or	more	of	the	valid	votes,	through	1997.12		Figure	3	shows	the	dominance	of	left-right	politics	in	Bolivia,	followed	by	its	collapse	around	2002	as	a	new	kind	of	politics	emerged.	
Figure	3:	Elite,	Left-Right	System	vs.	Indigenist,	Anti-System	Parties,	1979-2009	
	
Data	source:	Organo	Electoral	Plurinacional-Tribunal	Supremo	Electoral																																																									12	This	understates	the	system’s	dominance.		I	count	the	indigenist	MRTKL	and	EJE	as	“anti-systemic”	parties,	even	though	both	evolved	towards	allying	with	the	MNR	in	the	1993	election.		The	MRTKL’s	leader,	Victor	Hugo	Cardenas,	served	as	Bolivia’s	first	indigenous	Vice-President	during	Sánchez	de	Lozada’s	government	of	1993-97.	
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To	understand	what	sort	of	new	politics,	we	must	analyze	local	electoral	dynamics.		Figure	4	shows	local	voting	trends	across	all	municipalities	in	Bolivia,	aggregated	to	national	totals,	with	parties	again	categorized	as	Establishment,	Neopopulist,	Others,	MAS,	and	blank	+	null	votes.		We	do	not	count	MAS	splinters	this	time	because	of	the	bottom-up	nature	of	the	MAS	phenomenon.		As	described	above,	the	MAS	was	born	out	of	highly	local	groups	and	movements,	especially	in	rural	areas.		A	2004	change	in	election	law	allowed	such	organizations	to	contest	local	elections	for	the	first	time.		As	a	result,	many	registered	as	local	parties	for	municipal	elections,	but	federated	to	support	the	MAS	in	general	elections.		This	is	a	very	different	phenomenon	from	the	sort	of	splintering	that	occurs	when	rival	leaders	in	a	top-down	party	clash,	and	one	breaks	away	to	form	a	new	party.		Understanding	the	difference	is	key	to	understanding	the	dimensional	shift	that	transformed	Bolivian	politics.		I	return	to	this	below.	The	key	fact	during	this	period	is	that	Bolivian	politics	fractures	from	2004	onwards	into	a	huge	number	of	tiny	organizations.		From	a	low	of	seven	parties	in	1991,	and	then	18	in	1999,	the	number	of	parties	competing	in	local	elections	explodes	to	388	in	2004.		Many	of	these	parties	are	highly	specific	to	a	particular	region	or	locality,	such	as	APG-Charagua	and	CaCha,	which	compete	only	in	the	lowland	municipality	of	Charagua,	the	Villa	Poopo	party,	which	only	competes	in	highland	Villa	Poopo	municipality,	and	the	Calacoto	party,	which	only	competes	in	one	eponymous	suburb	of	La	Paz.		Most	of	these	hundreds	of	political	parties	were	tiny.		In	the	2004	election,	361	parties	received	less	than	0.5	percent	of	vote	nationwide;	many,	such	as	Litoral,	reaped	votes	in	only	one	municipality.		And	many	had	extremely	low	vote	totals,	such	as	Trabajo	
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y	Protección	Para	Todos,	which	received	14	votes	nationwide,	and	Falange	19	de	Abril,	
Maya	Copacabana,	and	Pos	Blanco,	which	received	none.		Appendix	2	provides	more	party-level	detail.	
Figure	4:	Municipal	Election	Voting	Patterns	
	
Data	source:	Organo	Electoral	Plurinacional-Tribunal	Supremo	Electoral	Figure	4	shows	that	the	national	collapse	of	establishment	parties	is	mirrored	in	local	politics.		Although	their	initial	dominance	of	three-quarters	of	the	vote	falls	earlier,	to	around	60	percent	in	1989,	this	level	is	then	sustained	consistently	through	1999,	when	it	drops	–	again	more	steeply	than	at	the	national	level	–	to	23	percent	in	2004,	and	then	below	ten	percent	in	2010.		Neopopulists	rise	faster	at	the	local	level,	to	around	one-third	of	the	vote	in	1989,	as	we	might	expect	from	parties	centered	on	migrant,	peri-urban	voters	in	highland	cities,	and	foreshadowing	the	bottom-up	earthquake	still	to	come.		They	retain	their	third	of	the	electorate	through	1995,	before	beginning	a	secular	descent	to	just	three	percent	in	2004.	The	biggest	difference	compared	to	general	election	trends	is	the	sustained	rise	of	Other	parties,	from	one	percent	in	1989,	and	still	only	seven	percent	in	1995,	to	50	
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percent	in	2004.		This	both	precedes	and	exceeds	the	rise	of	the	MAS,	which	reaches	36	percent	of	the	local	vote	in	2010.		To	understand	this	trend,	we	must	understand	that	these	are	no	longer	the	“Other”	parties	of	the	1980s	and	1990s	–	mainly	left	and	right-wing	projections	of	Bolivia’s	dominant	political	axis.		These	are,	rather,	new	–	and	in	their	immense	majority	highly	local	–	parties	that	did	not	exist	as	parties	before	2004.		They	are	part	and	parcel	of	the	political	turmoil	that	overthrew	the	previous	system	around	2003,	and	accompanied	the	rapid	rise	of	the	MAS	to	national	dominance.		Hyper-local	parties	are	not	only	the	ideological	and	organizational	cradle	of	the	MAS,	but	active	components	of	its	federal	structure	to	this	day.		This	local	effervescence	is	obscured	if	we	look	only	at	national	trends,	but	is	fully	visible	in	local	returns.	How	does	local	politics	look	in	terms	of	the	Systemic	vs.	Anti-System	tendencies	of	figure	3?		The	sheer	number	and	ill-definition	of	tiny	local	parties,	many	of	which	quickly	disappear,	make	it	impossible	to	reliably	characterize	their	ideologies.13		As	a	good	second-best,	I	categorize	local	parties	as	the	old	Elite,	Left-Right	axis	–	still	easy	to	spot	using	the	criteria	outlined	above	–	vs.	New	Local	Politics.		This	distinguishes	the	top-down,	elite-led	parties	that	dominated	Bolivian	public	life	after	the	1952	revolution,	from	the	bottom-up,	highly	local	parties,	often	based	in	social	or	civic	organizations,	that	blossomed	after	2002.	The	latter	group	contains	a	variety	of	ideological	and	programmatic	tendencies,	(along	with	many	parties	lacking	any	distinct	ideology).		But	they	do	share	the	following	broad	characteristics:	roots	in	rural	and	small-town	society,	or	peri-urban																																																									13	Many	of	these	are	indeed	anti-systemic,	and	after	2002	ally	with	the	MAS.		But	many	others	are	narrowly	localist.		And	for	scores	of	local	parties,	the	evidence	is	simply	too	weak	to	form	any	reasonable	judgement.	
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neighborhoods;	leadership	drawn	from	“brown	Bolivians”,	as	distinct	from	the	“white”	elite;	a	rejection	of	“neoliberalism”	defined	in	various	ways;	localism,	meaning	a	political	identification	with	subnational	place	–	localities	or	regions;	and	the	rejection	of	a	single,	centrally-defined	concept	of	“Bolivianness”	in	ideological,	economic,	and	cultural	terms,	in	favor	of	an	implicit	or	explicit	acceptance	of	Bolivia	as	a	collection	of	different	identities.		I	include	pre-2004	indigenist	parties	in	this	category	because	they	are	clearly	opposed	to	the	“Elite”,	because	scores	of	the	new	local	parties	adopted	their	programmatic	indigenismo,	and	because	many	of	their	leaders	and	most	of	their	voters	were	absorbed	post-2002	into	the	new	localism.		In	this	sense,	they	proved	harbingers	of	a	new	politics	that	rejected	the	old.		And	I	include	the	MAS	in	this	category	because	it	similarly	rejects	the	elite	and	its	politics,	and	because	it	is	organizationally	and	ideologically	based	on	an	agglomeration	of	large	numbers	of	local	parties	under	a	national	umbrella.	Some	of	these	new	local	parties,	like	the	Nueva	Fuerza	Republicana	(New	Republican	Force,	NFR)	or	the	Movimiento	Sin	Miedo	(Without	Fear	Movement,	MSM),	are	fragments	of	the	old	elite	trying	to	reconstitute	themselves	in	new	vehicles	and	with	new	discourses	better	suited	to	the	new	politics	of	Bolivia.		Although	less	avowedly	local	than	other	new	parties,	they	are	in	practice	conservative	localisms	firmly	rooted	in	particular	regions:	Cochabamba	in	the	case	of	the	NFR,	or	the	altiplano	in	the	case	of	the	MSM.		Although	some	have	national	pretensions,	for	now	they	fumble	for	a	more	general	identity	or	structure	that	appeals	beyond	their	strongholds.	Figure	5	compares	the	old	elite	politics	with	the	new	local	politics	between	1987-2010.		As	in	national	elections,	elite	parties	were	completely	dominant	at	the	local	level	
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until	1995,	reliably	capturing	89-93	percent	of	the	vote.		They	were	significantly	dominant	in	1999	election	as	well,	winning	77	percent	of	the	vote.		But	their	support	collapsed	in	the	2004	and	2010	elections	to	26	percent	and	then	ten	percent	of	the	vote.		In	parallel	to	surging	anti-system	parties	nationally,	we	see	here	the	rise	and	rise	of	the	new	localism,	from	three	percent	of	the	vote	in	1995	to	80	percent	in	2010.	
Figure	5:	Old	Elite	vs.	New	Local	Politics,	1987-2010	
	
Data	source:	Organo	Electoral	Plurinacional-Tribunal	Supremo	Electoral	By	2010	the	overturning	of	Bolivia’s	political	party	system,	at	both	national	and	local	levels,	is	complete.		It	is	not	just	an	important	party	or	alliance	that	has	died,	but	an	enduring	system	of	politics	defined	by	a	left-right	axis	of	competition,	arrayed	between	pro-worker	and	pro-capital	opposing	poles.		In	its	place	has	risen	a	new	system	centered	on	one	big,	umbrella	party,	with	hundreds	of	mostly	tiny	parties	revolving	around	it,	defined	by	the	politics	of	racial	and	cultural	identity,	organizationally	and	ideologically	strongly	rooted	in	the	localities	that	gave	them	birth.		This	new	system	is	still	forming,	but	it	is	strikingly,	palpably	different	to	the	politics	that	came	before.	
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4. Explaining Party System Collapse What	caused	this	revolution?		Why	did	Bolivian	voters	abandon	previously	stable	loyalties	–	not	just	to	parties,	but	to	candidates	and	personalities	–	that	had	withstood	political	and	economic	shocks	of	an	extremity	unknown	in	most	countries	not	at	war?		Why	did	the	appeal	of	well-established	parties	with	stable	cadres	and	significant	experience	of	wielding	power	and	managing	the	state	suddenly	pale	in	comparison	to	new	parties	–	and	especially	one	big	new	party	–	with	none	of	those	advantages?	Standard	answers	are	widespread	but	unconvincing.		The	2003	“gas	war”	disturbances,	which	led	to	a	massacre	of	protestors	by	security	forces,	clearly	led	to	the	resignation	of	MNR	President	Sánchez	de	Lozada.		But	did	they,	or	the	early-2000	“water	war”	protests	in	Cochabamba,	cause	Bolivia’s	political	party	system	to	collapse?		Timing	is	an	attractive	element	of	these	explanations,	but	the	causality	is	not	convincing.		Bolivia	has	been	a	mobilized	society	for	decades,	where	workers	are	highly	organized	and	protest	is	common	(Dunkerley	1984,	Mesa	et	al.	1997).		Although	both	sets	of	protests	were	impressive	in	scope,	they	were	neither	the	largest	nor	the	most	disruptive	in	Bolivia’s	history.		Other	public	disturbances	were	large,	occasionally	involved	massacres,	and	caused	governments	and	dictatorial	regimes	to	fall.		But	those	did	not	undermine	Bolivia’s	political	system.		While	we	might	expect	such	demonstrations	to	weaken	the	political	party	in	power,	we	would	also	expect	a	countervailing	strengthening	of	opposition	parties,	which	would	strengthen	the	established	party	system	by	validating	its	dominant	axis	of	contestation.		Instead	both	were	undermined.	
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Economic	Crisis?	Other	explanations	appealing	to	economic	or	fiscal	“crises”	are	also	unconvincing.		The	supposed	economic	crisis	of	the	late	1990s	and	early	2000s	simply	did	not	exist.		For	evidence	consider	figure	6,	which	plots	economic	growth	in	Bolivia	between	1961-2015.		The	red	circle	denotes	the	dates	of	political	system	collapse.		Bolivia’s	politics	had	withstood	economic	shocks	that	reduced	GDP	by	12	percent	in	the	late	1960s,	and	eight	percent	cumulatively	in	1982-1983,	without	falling	apart.		It	is	not	credible	that	a	period	of	increasing	growth14	of	between	2-5	percent	caused	political	implosion.	
Figure	6:	GDP	growth	(%,	annual)	
		
	 Data	sources:	World	Bank,	OECD	Arguments	about	a	fiscal	crisis	are	on	firmer	ground,	as	the	fiscal	account	during	the	early	2000s	was	at	least	in	deficit.		But	the	magnitude	of	the	supposed	“crisis”	is	suspect.		The	real	crisis	of	the	post-revolutionary	period	was	during	the	mid-1980s,	when	Bolivia’s	economy	melted	down,	its	fiscal	accounts	collapsed,	and	the	government	
																																																								14	Indeed,	Herranz	and	Peres	(2011)	estimate	that	in	2003	Bolivia’s	GDP/capita	was	about	to	surpass	a	previous	all-time	high,	first	achieved	in	1977.		That	previous	record	was	far	exceeded	after	2005.	
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attempted	–	but	ultimately	failed	–	to	survive	by	printing	heroic	amounts	of	money,	leading	to	hyperinflation.		Figure	7	shows	the	1984	deficit	in	excess	of	15	percent	of	GDP.		A	deficit	of	6.7	percent	of	GDP	in	2002,	while	not	healthy,	is	comparatively	unimpressive,	and	similar	to	other	periods	in	Bolivia’s	recent	history	when	its	politics	did	not	collapse.		More	to	the	point,	expenditure	was	actually	increasing	through	2003-04,	contracting	only	around	2005-06	as	a	result	of	political	turmoil,	before	increasing	again	in	2007-08.		So	fiscal	contraction	cannot	have	been	the	cause.	
Figure	7:	Global	and	Primary	Fiscal	Deficits,	1952-2012	
		 	
Source:	Kehoe	and	Machicado	(2014).	Reproduced	with	permission.	
Politics-Society	Mismatch	What,	then,	was	responsible?		I	argue	that	a	political	system	organized	around	a	left/worker	vs.	right/capital	dominant	axis	of	competition	was	wrong	for	a	country	like	Bolivia.		Such	a	political	system	was	fundamentally	disconnected	from	the	society	that	it	sought	to	represent	and	govern	for	the	simple	reason	that	Bolivia	has	never	really	had	industrial	workers	or	capital	in	the	required	concentrations.		The	system	that	arose	from	the	1952	revolution	presided	over	an	economy	that	was	overwhelmingly	agricultural,	and	a	society	that	was	overwhelming	rural.		A	politics	predicated	on	the	opposition	of	labor	to	capital	was	deeply	unsuited	to	both.		Attempts	to	industrialize,	which	might	
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have	caught	the	country	up	to	this	politics,	unambiguously	failed.		Even	today,	more	than	six	decades	later,	Bolivia’s	economy	is	still	dominated	by	agriculture	and	natural	resources.		And	its	working	class,	though	militant	and	highly	organized	during	the	1950s-1980s,	is	–	and	has	always	been	–	comparatively	small.	As	evidence,	consider	figure	8,	which	breaks	down	Bolivian	economic	activity	by	sector.		All	four	panels	compare	Bolivia	to	world	averages	over	the	period	1970-2014.	Although	the	world	average	includes	the	30	industrialized	countries	of	the	OECD,	it	is	dominated	by	160+	non-OECD	countries,	including	economies	like	Bangladesh,	Honduras,	Malawi,	and	Zambia.		“The	world”	is	thus	not	a	very	demanding	comparison.	Panel	(a)	shows	the	proportion	of	GDP	from	manufacturing,	a	common	measure	of	industrialization.		We	see	that	Bolivia	lies	consistently	and	non-trivially	below	the	world	average,	and	so	has	a	level	of	industrialization	that	is	low	compared	to	the	world	economy.		But	a	country	with	low	population	density	and	difficult	topography	is	perhaps	better	suited	to	service	sector-led	development,	where	transport	costs	are	arguably	less	important?		Panel	(b)	shows	that	Bolivia	significantly	–	and	increasingly	–	lags	the	worldwide	average	there	too.		If	neither	manufacturing	nor	services	is	relatively	important,	what	is?		Panels	(c)	and	(d)	provide	the	answer.		Agriculture’s	contribution	to	the	Bolivian	economy	is	more	than	three	times	the	world	average.		And	the	contribution	of	natural	resource	extraction	ranges	between	two	and	nine	times	the	world	average	(varying	with	world	price	swings).	
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Figure	8:	Bolivian	GDP	by	Sector	
	
Data	sources:	World	Bank,	OECD	So	an	economy	where	industrial	and	service	workers,	and	capital,	were	comparatively	scarce	was	instead	abundant	in	agriculture	and	natural	resource	extraction.		Could	the	mining	sector	–	both	its	capital	and	its	workers	–	have	been	large	enough	to	constitute	on	its	own	a	social	cleavage	that	organized	the	nation’s	politics?		Alternatively,	is	it	possible	that	non-manufacturing,	non-service	workers	unionized	in	sufficient	numbers	to	sustain	a	left-right	political	axis?		The	MNR	and	the	Central	Obrera	
Boliviana	(COB	–	the	country’s	chief	trades	union	federation)	sought	to	engineer	such	an	outcome,	compensating	for	Bolivia's	lack	of	industrial	workers	by	attempting	to	unionize	the	largest	share	of	its	workforce	–	agricultural	laborers	–	alongside	its	militant,	dominant	miners	(Dunkerley	1984,	Malloy	1970).	
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Historical	unionization	rates	for	Bolivia	are	surprisingly	hard	to	find,	but	three	of	the	most	credible	estimates	suggest	the	answer	to	both	questions	is:	No.		Mitchell	(1977)	estimates	that	in	1960,	at	the	height	of	its	power,	the	COB’s	total	membership	was	some	147,500	members	in	a	national	population	of	3.7	million,	or	about	four	percent	of	the	population.		This	is	consistent	with	Dunkerley’s	(1984)	estimates	of	a	total	manufacturing	labor	force	(including	non-unionized	workers)	of	four	percent	of	the	population,	and	a	total	mining	labor	force	of	3.2	percent	of	the	population,	in	1952.		By	1989	unionized	workers	had	risen	slightly	to	an	estimated	150,000+,	but	the	population	was	now	6.7	million,	yielding	a	unionization	rate	of	2.3	percent.		Bolivia	boasted	the	second	most	agricultural	economy	in	South	America	after	Paraguay,	and	the	second	least	industrialized	after	Peru	(US	Library	of	Congress	1989).		We	can	safely	conclude	that	neither	industrial	workers,	nor	the	labor	movement	more	broadly	construed,	represents	a	fundamental	cleavage	of	Bolivian	society.	
True	Cleavages	What,	then,	are	Bolivia’s	true	cleavages?		Answering	this	requires	looking	beyond	a	narrow,	urban	and	mining	conception	of	its	labor	force,	and	considering	the	main	characteristics	of	the	broader	society.		Let	us	begin	with	ethnicity	and	culture.		Figure	9	shows	population	by	primary	language	spoken.		In	1976,	almost	half	the	population	spoke	an	indigenous	language	(mainly	Quechua	and	Aymara)	as	their	primary	language.		Although	Spanish	has	grown	in	importance	over	time,	indigenous	languages	are	still	primary	for	40	percent	of	the	population.	But	this	likely	overstates	the	importance	of	Spanish,	which	many	Bolivians	speak	in	the	market	and	their	interactions	with	the	state,	while	retaining	indigenous	primary	
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languages	at	home.		A	better	sense	is	provided	by	figure	10:	while	81	percent	of	urban	Bolivians	first	learn	to	speak	in	Spanish,	in	rural	areas	only	36	percent	do,	with	two-thirds	speaking	an	indigenous	language	first.		Lastly,	figure	11	shows	Bolivians’	self-identification	by	indigenous	group.		Fifty-three	percent	of	urban	Bolivians	identify	with	an	indigenous	group;	but	in	rural	areas	fully	78	percent	do.	
Figure	9:	Bolivian	Population	by	Primary	Language	Spoken	
	
Data	source:	Instituto	Nacional	de	Estadística	(INE)	
Figure	10:	Bolivian	Population	by	Language	First	Spoken	(4	Years+)	
	
Source:	INE,	2001	Census	
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Figure	11:	Population	Shares	by	Self-Identified	Indigenous	Group	(15	Years+)	
	
Source:	INE,	2001	Census	Ethnicity	and	culture	are	thus	major	factors	that	divide	Bolivian	society	much	more	deeply	than	class.15		We	should	expect	them	to	inform	political	demands	and	shape	political	contestation.		But	figures	9-11	hint	at	a	rural-urban	divide	that	also	cleaves	society	in	important	ways.		Figure	12	shows	Bolivia’s	urban	transition	between	1950-2001,	the	period	during	which	society	transformed	from	three-quarters	rural	to	two-thirds	urban.	
																																																								15	Inspired	by	the	Mexican	PRI,	the	MNR	promoted	a	‘Bolivian	mestizo	race’,	a	melting-pot	identity	that	the	revolution	would	construct.		But	in	practice	society	remained	racially	segmented,	with	the	white	minority	on	top,	making	race	and	ethnicity	a	primary	social	cleavage.		Perhaps	as	a	result,	the	ascendant	MAS	promotes	the	idea	of	Bolivia	as	a	racial	‘salad’,	composed	of	distinct	elements.	
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Figure	12:	Evolution	of	Rural	and	Urban	Populations	
	
	 Source:	INE,	1950,	1976,	1992	and	2001	Censuses	The	rural-urban	dimension	is	important	in	its	own	right,	but	even	more	so	because	of	how	it	interacts	with	cultural	identities.		In	a	country	where	urban,	official	society	has	traditionally	been	Spanish-speaking	and	(to	a	lesser	extent)	white,	and	the	countryside	is	dominated	by	brown	skin	and	indigenous	languages,	the	rural-urban	divide	becomes	one	of	culture,	identity,	and	world-view.		And	the	process	of	migration	essential	to	urbanization	is	one	of	cultural	clash,	in	which	indigenous	people	come	into	direct,	everyday	contact	with	the	dominant,	Spanish-speaking	minority	often	for	the	first	time.16		In	so	doing,	their	ethnic	identities	–	present	but	latent	in	the	countryside,	where	they	are	dominant	–	are	activated	via	the	discrimination	they	experience;	and	activated	also	by	the	felt	poverty	of	an	urban	life	largely	defined	by	consumer	goods	that	the	countryside	lacks.	This	suggests	a	“folk	theorem”	of	identitarian	cleavage:	Ethnic	and	cultural	identities	become	politically	relevant	when	countries	reach	intermediate	thresholds	of	income	and	urbanization.		Before	then,	traditional	identities	are	latent	politically																																																									16	Some	areas	of	Bolivia	have	seen	extreme	rates	of	migration,	and	hence	cultural	collision,	in	excess	of	30	percent	of	the	population	base	(INE	2001).	
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precisely	because	they	are	majoritarian	in	rural	settings,	and	allied	to	poverty	in	urban	areas,	and	hence	anti-aspirational.		Income	growth	is	required	to	break	the	link	between	identity	and	poverty;	and	social	mixing	is	required	to	activate	ethnicity	and	culture	politically,	via	the	inequality	and	discrimination	that	urban	migrants	face.	 My	evidence	shows	that	a	left-right	axis	of	politics	was	wrong	from	the	start	for	a	society	in	which	most	people	lived	and	worked	beyond	the	industrial	economy,	and	to	whom	the	tension	between	workers	and	capital	was	irrelevant.		How,	then,	did	it	persist	for	so	long?		Much	of	Bolivian	society	–	in	particular	rural,	agrarian	Bolivia	–	lived	largely	in	ignorance	of	a	politics	that	was	urban	and	elite-dominated,	because	the	latter	appeared	to	impinge	so	little	on	the	former	(Klein	1992,	Zuazo	2009).		From	the	perspective	of	a	rural	villager,	politics	was	a	foreign	pursuit	undertaken	in	a	foreign	language	by	foreign	people	who	chanted	slogans	–	‘Revolution	of	the	proletariat!’	‘The	sanctity	of	property!’	–	unconnected	to	one’s	real	and	pressing	concerns.		The	sheer	poverty	of	rural	life,	and	the	high	cost	of	reaching	the	urban	core,	helped	ensure	that	the	two	–	axis	and	cleavage	–	remained	largely	insulated	from	each	other	for	decades.	But	increasing	urbanization	gradually	brought	rural,	indigenous	Bolivia	into	intimate	contact	with	the	nation’s	politics	and	the	state.		Different	elements	of	society	saw	each	other	fully;	essential	differences	were	revealed.		These	dimensions	of	difference	were	real,	deep,	and	embraced	the	bulk	of	society.		But	they	were	strangely	unreflected	in	parties’	ideologies,	in	the	terms	of	political	contestation,	or	in	the	promises	politicians	made.		And	so	an	elite	party	system,	so	dominant	until	then,	found	
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itself	first	discredited,	and	then	abandoned	wholesale	by	millions	of	voters	to	whom	they	suddenly	did	not	matter.	
Decentralization	as	Trigger	Why	did	party	system	collapse	occur	in	the	way,	and	at	the	time,	that	it	did?		If	dimensional	shift	provides	the	macro	logic	of	Bolivia’s	party	system	collapse,	decentralization	provides	the	micro	mechanism.		Bolivia	decentralized	in	1994	via	the	“Law	of	Popular	Participation”,	which	sought	to	improve	public	sector	performance	and	increase	the	legitimacy	of	the	state	by	creating	hundreds	of	municipalities	throughout	especially	rural	Bolivia,	so	taking	government	“closer	to	the	people”.		The	reform	was	strikingly	simple	and	straightforward.		Its	five	main	points	(Faguet	2012)	were:	1. Responsibility	for	the	provision	of	primary	services:	education,	health,	transport,	etc.,	and	related	infrastructure,	were	transferred	from	central	government	to	municipalities.	2. Twenty	percent	of	national	tax	revenues	were	transferred	to	municipalities.	3. Transfers	were	allocated	amongst	municipalities	on	a	strict	per	capita	basis.	4. New	municipalities	were	created,	and	existing	ones	expanded,	to	incorporate	all	Bolivian	citizens	and	territory	into	the	system.	5. Oversight	Committees	incorporating	natural	civic	organizations	(e.g.	peasant	unions,	neighborhood	committees,	ayllus,	mallkus)	were	designed	into	municipal	government,	thus	building	grass-roots	accountability	into	the	law.	From	the	start,	the	instruments	of	local	government	were	embraced	by	especially	rural	Bolivians.		Voter	turnout	increased	127	percent	nationwide,	and	there	was	massive	grass-roots	participation	in	local	planning	and	accountability	
39
	 39	
mechanisms	in	Bolivia’s	towns	and	villages	(Faguet	and	Pöschl	2015).		Decentralization’s	effects	on	public	sector	investment	patterns	were	similarly	immediate,	dramatic,	and	nationwide.		Resources	shifted	from	a	small	number	of	rich	districts	to	Bolivia’s	smaller,	poorer,	more	rural,	traditionally	abandoned	municipalities.		The	Bolivian	state	became	more	responsive	to	local	needs	because	of	the	actions	of	its	municipalities	(Faguet	2012	and	2014).		Decentralization	quickly	became	a	defining	national	characteristic.		Not	even	the	political	earthquake	of	2002	could	undo	this	reform.	A	secondary,	unplanned	(Sánchez	de	Lozada	and	Faguet	2015)	but	ultimately	fateful,	consequence	was	that	decentralization	extended	a	ladder	from	the	nation’s	public	and	political	life	down	into	its	rural,	indigenous	society.		In	so	doing,	it	allowed	large	numbers	of	rural	Bolivians	to	become	political	actors	in	their	own	right	for	the	first	time.		This	happened	when	candidates	for	hundreds	of	new	municipal	council	and	oversight	committee	positions	throughout	the	land	were	not	the	usual	political	elites	–	who	of	course	did	not	live	in	these	places	–	but	rather	bricklayers,	truck	drivers,	and,	above	all,	peasants	with	surnames	like	Callisaya,	Choquehuanca,	and	Mamani.	For	the	first	time	in	500	years,	members	of	Bolivia’s	ethnic	and	cultural	majority	ran	for	public	office	in	large	numbers,	were	elected,	and	proceeded	to	wield	(local)	power.		As	Faguet	(2012)	comprehensively	shows,	these	new	political	agents	not	only	did	not	do	badly,	they	performed	better	than	the	elite-run	central	government	at	basic	tasks	of	first-order	importance,	like	building	primary	schools,	running	health	clinics,	and	clearing	and	paving	local	roads.		This	demonstrated	in	
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the	most	obvious	way	that	politics	and	the	exercise	of	power	should	not	be	considered	foreign	to,	or	beyond	the	abilities	of,	the	majority.		Ordinary	Bolivians	were	perfectly	capable	of	assuming	political	leadership,	ruling	themselves,	and	doing	it	well.17	They	did	so	initially	under	the	banners	of	established,	elite	political	parties.		This	was	partly	from	habit,	but	more	importantly	because	of	onerous	restrictions	on	political	competition.		Pre-1994	there	were	few	local	and	no	regional	elections,	and	hence	politics	was	by	construction	national.		New	parties	were	registered	at	the	national	level	only,	and	were	required,	inter	alia,	to	raise	a	petition	signed	by	two	percent	of	the	national	electorate	before	they	could	register.		This	was	the	case	even	if	they	intended	to	run	in	only	a	few	localities	(Romero	2005).		The	effect	of	these	restrictions	was	to	sustain	an	oligopoly	on	political	competition	run	by	a	rich,	white,	urban	elite.	The	new	modus	operandi	quickly	became	apparent:	party	representatives	arrived	in	distant	municipalities	shortly	before	a	local	election,	distributed	gifts	and	propaganda,	organized	rallies,	and	then	returned	to	their	urban	enclaves	to	await	the	next	iteration.		Local	party	leaders	were	selected	by	the	national	structure.		The	top-down	conduct	of	national	politics	continued,	albeit	in	somewhat	more	distributed	form.	But	at	the	local	level	something	very	different	was	happening.		New	political	actors	competed	for	votes	and	exercised	power	in	terms	of	the	major	problems	and																																																									17	Hence	the	MAS’	concept	of	“internal	colonization”:	colonialism	did	not	end	when	the	Spanish	surrendered,	but	continued	for	centuries	in	a	transmogrified	republican	form.	
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demands	that	actually	affected	voters’	lives.		As	the	MAS	began	to	gel	at	the	end	of	the	century,	its	structure	sped	this	process	along.		An	umbrella	federation	of	hundreds	of	hyper-local	parties	and	movements,	the	MAS	was	easily	able	to	sense	the	problems	and	demands	that	animate	voters	at	the	grass	roots	of	Bolivia.		These	are	born	of	poverty	and	inequality,	discrimination,	social	and	economic	exclusion,	exploitation,	corruption,	and	oppression	–	phenomena	natural	to	the	deep	ethnic	and	cultural	divides	that	characterize	society.		Acting	on	them,	as	new	actors	did,	de-aligned	politics	from	the	left-right	chimaera	and	re-aligned	it	with	an	axis	that	mirrors	how	most	Bolivians	experience	their	lives.	It	is	not	inconceivable	that	Bolivia’s	elite	parties	might	have	been	able	to	survive	the	new	politics.		Significant	adaptation	would	have	been	required	–	not	just	ideological	and	programmatic,	but	to	parties’	internal	structures	and	incentives.		At	a	minimum	parties	would	have	had	to	decentralize	themselves	if	they	hoped	to	harness	some	part	of	the	grass-roots	energy	and	innovation	that	reform	unleashed.		But	they	did	not	(Bonifaz	2016,	CIDES-PNUD	1997,	Sánchez	de	Lozada	and	Faguet	2015).		Bolivia’s	institutions	and	political	actors	changed,	but	its	political	structures	tried	not	to.18	Unsurprisingly,	this	late-1990s	dispensation	proved	not	an	equilibrium.		During	the	decade	following	reform,	it	became	clear	to	local	leaders	and	their	electorates	that	party	programs	were	unconnected	to	local	issues	(Mainwaring	2006),	and	toeing	the	line	was	detrimental	to	getting	elected.		During	the	1980s	and																																																									18	Interestingly,	this	mirrors	the	recent	experience	of	mainstream	European	parties,	which	also	resisted	change	even	as	political	conflict	was	transformed	by	a	consolidating	cultural/community	dimension	of	politics,	which	cuts	across	the	established	left-right	axis	(Hooghe	and	Marks	2016).	
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1990s,	complementary	reforms	to	facilitate	citizen	documentation	and	voter	registration,	and	extend	voting	places	deeper	into	the	countryside,	had	greatly	facilitated	electoral	participation.		Then	in	2004,	the	final	element	sustaining	elite	oligopoly	fell,	and	a	tidal	wave	was	unleashed.		The	2004	Ley	de	Agrupaciones	
Ciudadanas	y	Pueblos	Indígenas	(Law	of	Citizen	Associations	and	Indigenous	Peoples)	liberalized	election	law	significantly,	permitting	civic	associations	to	participate	in	elections,	and	allowing	groups	to	register	in	only	those	municipalities	in	which	they	wished	to	compete.		The	two	percent	bar	now	applied	to	local,	not	national,	electorates.		A	people	that	had	discovered	it	could	represent	itself,	could	now	form	its	own	political	organizations.		During	the	months	that	followed,	388	new	parties	registered	for	local	elections.		Elite	politics	was	no	more.	To	understand	the	magnitude	of	the	change,	consider	how	decentralization	changed	the	composition	of	Congress.		Before	reform,	congressmen	were	overwhelmingly	white,	male,	urban-based	businessmen,	professionals,	and	landowners.		They	penetrated	politics	laterally	at	the	national	level.		By	2009,	half	of	congressmen	were	new	political	actors	from	rural	and	peri-urban	Bolivia	(Bonifaz	2016,	Dargatz	and	Zuazo	2012,	Romero	2012,	Zuazo	2009).		They	first	entered	politics	at	the	local	level,	and	had	very	different	educations,	work	experiences,	and	surnames	than	the	politicians	they	replaced.		The	change	in	the	political	class	was	even	sharper	in	the	constitutional	assembly	of	2006-07,	where	a	large	majority	were	new	politicians	who	got	their	start	in	local	politics	and	social	organizations	(Ayo	and	Bonifaz	2008,	Choque	2014,	Zuazo	and	Quiroga	2011).	
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Or	consider	the	political	trajectories	of	two	politicians	of	the	new	breed.		Wilber	Flores	Torres	entered	politics	as	a	peasant	member	of	the	local	chapter	of	the	peasants’	union.		He	was	elected	a	peasant	leader,	and	then	rose	through	positions	in	the	provincial	and	departmental	peasants’	union	to	join	the	national	executive	of	the	Federation	of	Peasants’	Unions.		In	the	old	Bolivia	his	story	would	probably	have	ended	there.		But	in	the	new	Bolivia	he	was	elected	councilman	in	the	municipality	of	Zudáñez	(Chuquisaca),	and	then	mayor	of	Zudáñez,	and	finally	national	congressman	from	Chuquisaca	for	the	MAS	(Zuazo	2009).		Or	Hilario	Callisaya	Quispe,	who	also	entered	politics	as	a	peasant	union	leader,	and	was	then	elected	to	various	leadership	roles	in	that	union	and	his	community	organization.		At	this	point	his	story	might	also	have	ended.		Instead,	he	became	an	officer	in	his	municipality’s	oversight	committee.		He	was	elected	municipal	councilman,	and	then	president	of	the	council,	before	rising	to	become	a	congressman	from	La	Paz	for	the	MAS	(Zuazo	2009).		Neither	of	these	stories	is	special	in	the	new	Bolivia,	and	yet	each	is	remarkable.	
5. Conclusion	Why	did	the	revolutionaries	of	1952	design	a	party	system	around	a	dominant	axis	unconnected	to	Bolivia’s	economy	and	society?		The	first	answer	is	that	they	did	not.		Party	systems	and	dominant	axes	are	not	‘designed’	in	that	way.		But	it	is	nonetheless	true	that	a	result	of	revolutionaries’	actions	–	both	discursive	and	organizational	–	was	to	plant	the	seeds	of	such	a	system.		Were	they	misguided?		Craven?		Ignorant?	
44
	 44	
The	assertion	of	a	non-racial,	non-cultural	axis	of	competition	obviously	suited	the	educated	sons	of	Bolivia’s	then-tiny	middle	class.		But	it	was	also	strategically	astute.		Amongst	the	revolutionary	forces	that	Paz	Estenssoro	and	Siles	Zuazo	led	to	victory,	the	workers’	unions	–	especially	the	miners	–	were	the	best	organized,	most	militant,	and	most	threatening	to	any	government.		Declaring	a	social	cleavage	centered	on	workers	cemented	their	alliance	with	the	MNR,	and	ensured	that	the	MNR	was	in	some	sense	baked	into	not	just	the	nation’s	politics,	but	its	identity.		Such	an	idea	was	easy	to	sell	mid-twentieth	century,	when	the	conflict	between	workers	and	capital	was	the	dominant	ideology	of	advanced	countries,	and	the	dominant	form	of	contestation	worldwide.		It	was	also	a	sort	of	investment	in	the	future;	if	the	state-led	industrialization	process	revolutionaries	hoped	to	catalyze	succeeded,	an	expanding	worker	class	would	richly	benefit	the	MNR.	 The	new	system	was	extraordinarily	successful.		The	main	establishment	parties	completely	dominated	the	post-revolutionary	period,	reliably	capturing	three-quarters	of	the	vote	as	late	as	1989.		More	importantly	and	impressively,	the	broader	left-right	system	of	elite-led	parties	won	84-93	percent	of	the	vote	in	national	elections,	and	89-93	percent	in	local	elections,	as	late	as	1997.		This	dominance	was	paired	with	great	resilience.		The	system	was	subjected	to	extraordinary	shocks	–	military	coups,	hyperinflation	and	economic	collapse,	civil	disturbances,	guerrilla	insurgency,	and	sweeping	social	change	–	only	to	see	the	same	parties,	leaders,	and	the	same	axis	of	competition	return	time	and	again	to	contest	another	election.	
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How	did	it	all	fall	apart?		Why	did	not	just	leading	parties,	but	the	entire	elite	system,	collapse?		Common	explanations	for	Bolivia’s	political	revolution	are	unconvincing.		The	gas	and	water	“wars”	were	of	insufficient	consequence	to	suddenly	implode	a	system	that	had	withstood	far	worse.		The	fiscal	retrenchment	of	the	early	2000s	was	an	unremarkable	test.		And	there	was	no	economic	crisis	to	speak	of.	Explaining	political	change	of	this	magnitude	requires	a	cause	that	is	consequential,	as	distinct	from	a	current	event.		A	far	better	candidate	is	the	replacement	of	Bolivia’s	primary	axis	of	political	competition	–	which	described	a	society	it	patently	was	not	–	with	a	new	axis	better	matched	to	its	major	social	cleavage.		Political	competition	over	workers	vs.	capitalists	never	made	sense	in	a	country	that	lacked	both.		Competing	over	ethnicity	and	cultural	identity	made	much	more	sense	in	a	society	riven	by	both.	In	an	incompletely	institutionalized	democracy	with	partial	incorporation	and	great	urban-rural	divides,	the	wrong	cleavage	could	remain	“frozen”	in	place	for	decades.		What	catalyzed	change?		Increasing	urbanization	activated	the	dormant	cultural	cleavage,	as	more	and	more	Bolivians	felt	the	primacy	of	identity	over	class.		But	it	was	decentralization	that	provided	the	trigger	–	not	the	cause	–	by	which	this	cleavage	could	become	political.		By	creating	hundreds	of	municipalities,	decentralization	generated	hundreds	of	new	political	spaces	in	which	the	indigenous	and	mestizo	majority	could	become	political	actors	in	their	own	right.		Over	time	new	politicians	generated	their	own	proposals,	found	their	own	political	lexicon,	and	exercised	local	power	successfully.		The	irrelevance	of	the	dominant	
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system	revealed	itself	to	them	not	analytically,	but	in	the	practical	sense	of	what	was	required	to	win	elections	and	respond	to	constituents’	demands.		Over	the	course	of	a	decade,	these	new	political	actors	abandoned	first	the	ideological	discourse	of	the	elite	party	system,	and	then	the	parties	themselves.	When	electoral	law	was	liberalized	to	reduce	barriers	to	entry,	the	dam	broke,	unleashing	a	flood	of	new	parties	that	drowned	the	old	system.		Politics	didn’t	so	much	fracture	as	disintegrate.		A	handful	of	parties	tightly	controlled	from	the	top	by	privileged	urban	elites	gave	way	to	hundreds	of	tiny	parties	with	ultra-local	concerns,	constituted	and	run	by	unprivileged,	ordinary	Bolivians.		And	in	the	middle	of	them	all	the	MAS,	a	federal	party	born	of	social	movements	that	agglomerates	local	micro-parties	at	election	time,	and	–	to	a	surprising	degree	–	reports	downward	to	them	in-between.		These	structural	attributes	have	aligned	a	still-forming	system	far	more	readily	with	the	real	social	cleavages	that	define	Bolivia.	My	analysis	underlines	the	deep	insight	of	Lipset	and	Rokkan’s	model.		Consider	a	few	of	their	big	ideas:	Party	systems	should	be	linked	to	underlying	social	cleavages,	and	weak	linkages	are	a	source	of	instability.		Change	in	party	systems	should	come	from	rising	new	parties,	and	not	established	party	adaptation,	as	parties’	organizational	characteristics	induce	high	degrees	of	stickiness.		Stickiness	also	implies	that	adjustment	is	not	continuous	but	happens	suddenly,	in	jumps	and	lurches.		The	Bolivian	experience	confirms	this	all.	Lipset	and	Rokkan	also	stress	the	importance	of	social	identity,	where	politically	relevant	organizations	form	around	self-conscious	groups	and	a	solidarity	
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born	of	lived	experience.		This	was	important	to	the	formation	of	European	parties,	and	is,	as	we	have	seen,	a	defining	factor	of	the	new	Bolivian	politics.		They	further	argue	that	the	conflict	between	workers	and	capitalists	is	the	least	important	of	the	four	cleavages	they	describe.		This	claim,	it	is	worth	mentioning,	concerns	countries	that	had	already	felt	the	full	effects	of	the	industrial	revolution.		If	their	claim	is	correct,	it	must	hold	doubly	for	the	majority	of	the	world’s	countries	which	have	not.		In	Bolivia,	it	clearly	does.	Which	leads	to	a	final	question:	How	many	other	non-industrial	countries	feature	party	systems	arrayed	along	the	wrong	axis?		Whether	hangovers	of	European	colonialism,	relics	of	the	Cold	War,	or	products	of	ideological	mimicry	or	contagion,	left/worker	vs.	right/capital	systems	are	in	principle	ill-matched	to	the	dominant	cleavages	of	developing	societies	actually	shaped	by	ethnic,	cultural	or	regional	factors.		At	a	parochial	level,	the	academy	acknowledges	this	too	infrequently,	jumping	instead	to	data	on	unionization	and	class	as	soon	as	a	country’s	political	cleavage	must	be	measured.		More	importantly,	such	a	politics	is	likely	to	reduce	public	sector	efficiency,	degrade	democratic	legitimacy,	and	undermine	citizens’	happiness.		The	implication	is	a	swathe	of	countries,	infected	with	a	simulacrum	of	20th	century	European	politics,	that	are	ripe	for	revolution	from	below	a	la	Boliviana.		
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Appendix	1:	National	Election	Results,	1979-2009		
		 	
National	Election	Results
1979 1980 1985 1989 1993 1997 2002 2005 2009
Valid 1,469,477 Valid 1,309,034 Valid 1,521,174 Valid 1,421,355 Valid 1,642,965 Valid 2,177,171 Valid 2,778,808 Valid 2,873,801 Valid 4,462,411
TOTAL 1,693,333 TOTAL 1,489,484 TOTAL 1,745,929 TOTAL 1,587,135 TOTAL 1,726,168 TOTAL 2,321,117 TOTAL 2,994,065 TOTAL 3,102,416 TOTAL 4,734,339
UDP 31% UDP 34% ADN 29% MNR 23% MNR-MRTKL 34% ADN 21% MNR 21% MNR 6% UN-CP 5%
MNR 31% MNR 18% MNR 26% ADN 22% AP 20% MNR 17% MIR 15% PODEMOS 26% PPB-APB 25%
ADN 13% MNRU 2% MIR 9% MIR 20% MBL 5% MIR 16% ADN 3% UN 7% MUSPA 0%
PS-1 4% ADN 15% MNRI 5% IU 7% VR-9 1% MBL 3% UCS 5% NFR 1% Pulso 0%
APIN 4% PRA 2% MNRV 4% MIN 1% CONDEPA 14% PDB 0% CONDEPA 0% USTB 0% MAS-IPSP 60%
PUB 1% AFIN 1% MNRI-1 1% CONDEPA 11% UCS 13% CONDEPA 16% NFR 19% FREPAB 0% AS 2%
VO 1% PRIN 1% FPU 2% PS-1 3% ARBOL 2% UCS 15% LJ 3% MAS 50% BSD 0%
MITKA 2% PS-1 8% PS-1 2% FSB 1% ASD 2% IU 3% PS 1% MIP 2% GENTE 0%
Blank 3% FDR 3% PDC 1% MRTKL 1% FSB 1% VSB 1% MCC 1% Blank 4% Blank 3%
Null 10% FSB 1% FSB 1% FULKA 1% IU 1% EJE 1% MAS 19% Null 3% Null 2%
PUB 1% POR 1% Null 6% IND 0% Blank 3% MIP 6%
MITKA-1 1% ACP 1% Blank 4% MFD 0% Null 3% Blank 4%
MITKA 1% IU 1% EJE 1% Null 3%
Blank 7% FNP 1% MKN 1%
Null 6% AUR 1% Blank 2%
ARENA 1% Null 3%
Establishment	parties MRTKL 2%
Neopopulist	parties MRTK 1%
Other Blank 7%
Indigenist Null 6%
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Appendix	2:	Municipal	Election	Results,	1987-2010	
1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1999 2004 2010
Valid 1,139,883 Valid 895,131 Valid 1,245,467 Valid 1,119,785 Valid 1,712,097 Valid 2,001,801 Valid 2,674,838 Valid 3,973,737
TOTAL 1,284,317 TOTAL 1,004,267 TOTAL 1,344,629 TOTAL 1,189,817 TOTAL 1,801,271 TOTAL 2,124,509 TOTAL 2,879,389 TOTAL 4,408,002
ADN 25% AP 30% AP 25% MNR 33% MNR 20% MNR 19% MIR___NM 7% MNR_PUEBLO 1%
MIR 23% MNR 17% MNR 24% MBL 11% MBL 13% MIR 15% MNR 6% UN 4%
MNR 11% IU 7% MBL 5% MIR_NM 9% ADN_PDC 11% ADN 14% UN 5% UN_CP 3%
MBL 7% FRI 1% FRI 2% ADN 7% MIR 9% MBL 4% ADN 2% MNR 0%
VR_9 6% VR_9 1% UCS 22% FRI 2% FRI 3% VR9 2% MBL 2% ADN 0%
FRI 2% CONDEPA 17% CONDEPA 12% VR_9 0% MRTKL 1% FRI 2% FRI 0% UCS 2%
MIN 1% UCS 15% IU 4% MRTKL 0% VR_9 0% UCS 11% MNR_MIR_NM 0% MAS_IPSP 31%
AP_ 5% MST 1% Blank 3% CONDEPA 18% UCS 17% CONDEPA 4% PODEMOS 0% MAS_IPSP_A 4%
PS_1 4% VS_B 0% Null 4% UCS 8% CONDEPA 15% MAS-U 3% UCS 3% MSM 12%
FSB 2% MFD 0% FSB 2% IU 3% NFR 8% UCS_MBL 0% SPT 8%
MFD 1% Blank 3% ASD 2% MPP 2% MSM 5% MAS 17% PAIS 2%
ID 1% Null 8% IU 1% EJE 2% PS 3% MSM 8% M_P_S_ 2%
PDC 1% EJE 1% MKN 0% FSB 2% PP 6% AS_ 1%
Blank 6% Blank 2% Blank 2% PCB 1% AS_XXI 3% FA 1%
Null 6% Null 4% Null 3% KND 0% NFR 3% PRIMERO 1%
PDC 0% FRENTE_AMP 3% UNIR 1%
MPP 0% MUP 2% ASP 1%
MRTKL 0% CIU 2% VERDES 1%
Blank 2% MIP 2% FPV 1%
Null 4% MOVIBOL 1% TODOS 1%
AS_ 1% UNE 1%
MCSFA 1% PAN 1%
M_17 1% VOCES 1%
BUS_3R 1%
MPC 1%
SPT 1% Blank 4%
MPSC 1% Null 6%
Blank 2%
N.B. Percentages	expressed	as	a	share	of	the	national	vote.	After	1999,	most	parties	are	only	registered	in	some	municipalities. Null 5%
Establishment	parties
Neopopulist	parties
MAS
361	additional	parties,	each	with	
<0.5%	of	the	vote
155	additional	parties,	each	with	
<0.5%	of	the	vote
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